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    Free Will I (handout)

    enMay 20, 2013
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    About this Episode

    If the world is causally determined, does this mean people no longer have free will? Or is being free compatible with determinism. In this lecture, I discuss two opposing positions regarding the existence of free will even though both agree that genuine free will is incompatible with determinism. On the one hand, there are hard determinists who think that because determinism is true, then this means that free will does not exist. On the other hand, there are libertarians who think that the falsity of determinism leads to the actual existence of an agent that chooses freely.

    Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

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    Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

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    Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

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    Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

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    Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

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    Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

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    Copyright 2013 Jack Reynolds / La Trobe University, all rights reserved. Contact for permissions.

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