Skagit tribe v Lundgren (Late argument rejection)

Trump v. Anderson

A group of Colorado voters contends that Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits former President Donald J. Trump, who seeks the Presidential nomination of the Republican Party in this year’s election, from becoming President again. The Colorado Supreme Court agreed with that contention. It ordered the Colorado secretary of state to exclude the former President from the Republican primary ballot in the State and to disregard any write-in votes that Colorado voters might cast for him. Former President Trump challenges that decision on several grounds. Because the Constitution makes Congress, rather than the States, responsible for enforcing Section 3 against federal officeholders and candidates, we reverse. 

Read by Jake Leahy. 

Trump v. Anderson

DONALD J. TRUMP, PETITIONER v. NORMA ANDERSON, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF COLORADO [March 4, 2024] JUSTICE BARRETT, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I join Parts I and II–B of the Court’s opinion. I agree that States lack the power to enforce Section 3 against Presidential candidates. That principle is sufficient to resolve this case, and I would decide no more than that. This suit was brought by Colorado voters under state law in state court. It does not require us to address the complicated question whether federal legislation is the exclusive vehicle through which Section 3 can be enforced. The majority’s choice of a different path leaves the remaining Justices with a choice of how to respond. In my judgment, this is not the time to amplify disagreement with stridency. The Court has settled a politically charged issue in the volatile season of a Presidential election. Particularly in this circumstance, writings on the Court should turn the national temperature down, not up. For present purposes, our differences are far less important than our unanimity: All nine Justices agree on the outcome of this case. That is the message Americans should take home. 

Read by RJ Dieken. 

Trump v. Anderson

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, JUSTICE KAGAN, and JUSTICE JACKSON, concurring in the judgment. 

"“If it is not necessary to decide more to dispose of a case, then it is necessary not to decide more.” Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U. S. 215, 348 (2022) (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in judgment). That fundamental principle of judicial restraint is practically as old as our Republic. This Court is authorized “to say what the law is” only because “[t]hose who apply [a] rule to particular cases . . . must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803) (emphasis added). 

Today, the Court departs from that vital principle, deciding not just this case, but challenges that might arise in the future. In this case, the Court must decide whether Colorado may keep a Presidential candidate off the ballot on the ground that he is an oathbreaking insurrectionist and thus disqualified from holding federal office under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Allowing Colorado to do so would, we agree, create a chaotic state-by-state patchwork, at odds with our Nation’s federalism principles. That is enough to resolve this case. Yet the majority goes further. Even though “[a]ll nine Members of the Court” agree that this independent and sufficient rationale resolves this case,  five Justices go on. They decide novel constitutional questions to insulate this Court and petitioner from future controversy. Ante, at 13. Although only an individual State’s action is at issue here, the majority opines on which federal actors can enforce Section 3, and how they must do so. The majority announces that a disqualification for insurrection can occur only when Congress enacts a particular kind of legislation pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In doing so, the majority shuts the door on other potential means of federal enforcement. We cannot join an opinion that decides momentous and difficult issues unnecessarily, and we therefore concur only in the judgment."

Read by Jeff Barnum. 

MCELRATH v. GEORGIA 

Damian McElrath was charged with malice murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault -- all related to the death of his mother.  A jury returned a split verdict.  For the malice-murder charge, finding him “not guilty by reason of insanity” and “guilty but mentally ill” to the other counts.  The Georgia Supreme Court stated that because these findings were inconsistent by finding different mental states, he should be retried under the Georgia "repugnant" doctrine.  McElrath argued he could not be re-tried because of the Fifth Amendment's protection against double jeopardy. 

"Held: The jury’s verdict that McElrath was not guilty of malice murder by reason of insanity constituted an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes notwithstanding any inconsistency with the jury’s other verdicts.

(a) The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that “[n]o person shall . . . be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” 5th Amendment. “[I]t has long been settled under the Fifth Amendment that a verdict of acquittal is final, ending a defendant’s jeopardy, and . . . is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offence.” Green v. United States. The Court’s “cases have defined an acquittal to encompass any ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense.” Evans v. Michigan. Once rendered, a jury’s verdict of acquittal is inviolate. The principle “that ‘[a] verdict of acquittal . . . could not be reviewed, on error or otherwise,’ ” is “[p]erhaps the most fundamental rule in the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence.” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co.. Whatever the basis for a jury’s verdict, see Bravo-Fernandez v. United States, the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits second-guessing the reason for a jury’s acquittal. 

(b) Georgia law specifically provides that a defendant who establishes an insanity defense “shall not be found guilty of [the] crime.” Ga. Code. Here, the jury concluded that McElrath was not guilty by reason of insanity with respect to the malice-murder charge. That verdict was unquestionably a “ruling that the prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense,” Evans, and thus an acquittal. Georgia argues that there was no valid verdict pursuant to Georgia law, and thus no acquittal. But whether an acquittal has occurred for double jeopardy purposes is a question of federal law, and a State’s characterization of a ruling is not binding on the Court. Smalis v. Pennsylvania. While States have the power “to regulate procedures under which [their] laws are carried out,” Patterson v. New York, the ultimate question remains whether the Double Jeopardy Clause recognizes an event as an acquittal. The jury’s verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity here constituted such a determination, and it is of no moment that the verdict was accompanied by other verdicts appearing to rest on inconsistent findings. An acquittal is an acquittal, even when a jury returns inconsistent verdicts. Bravo-Fernandez. Georgia argues that the bar to second-guessing an acquittal applies only to general verdicts, but the Court’s cases prohibit any speculation about the reasons for a jury’s verdict of acquittal—even when, as here, specific jury findings provide a factual basis for such speculation. To do otherwise “would impermissibly authorize judges to usurp the jury right.” Smith v. United States. "

Reversed and Remanded. JACKSON, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. 

Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion noting that he believes this decision is limited only to review of an acquittal (as the trial judge found here), but it does not apply when a trial judge refuses to accept an inconsistent verdict at trial. 

Read by Jake Leahy. 

Great Lakes v. Raiders

Great Lakes Insurance (organized in Germany and HQ in UK) entered into a maritime insurance contract with Raiders Retreat Realty Company (HQ in PA).  The contract included a provision to apply New York law.  A Raiders vessel had an incident in Florida, Raiders then filed a claim.  Great Lakes filed for declaratory judgment in a Pennsylvania federal court.  Raiders responded in that case.  The PA federal court applied New York law and denied the Raiders claims under Pennsylvania law.  On appeal, the Third Circuit recognized that choice of law provisions in Maritime contracts were presumptively valid, but that there must be a valid public policy reason to allow for it.  The Third Circuit remanded back to the federal district court, instructing the court to consider the public policy interests of Pennsylvania in the maritime insurance context.  Held: Choice of law provisions in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable under federal maritime law, with narrow exceptions, not applicable here.  Justice Kavanaugh, writing for a unanimous court, explains that this strong presumption exists, in part, to support uniformity across maritime law, he reasons that the Court's precedent about venue selection clauses further demonstrates this.  

Justice Thomas Concurrence.  Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, but writing that he believed the Court's reliance on Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance, 348 US 310 (1955) to be wrongly placed.  In that case, Thomas writes, the Court chose to apply state law, rather than applying the presumption about the choice of law provisions, after applying a two-party test, this test asks:  “(1) Is there a judicially established federal admiralty rule governing these warranties? (2) If not, should we fashion one?” Id., at 314. Answering both questions in the negative, this Court concluded that state law governs the effect of a breach of warranty in a marine-insurance policy."  Although the Court has limited this primarily "local disputes," he cautions that the Court's reasoning in that case is "deeply flawed." 

Read by Jeff Barnum. 

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE RURAL DEVELOPMENT RURAL HOUSING SERVICE v. KIRTZ
 
Reginald Kirtz obtained a loan from the Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service.  According to Kirtz, the USDA later told one of the major credit agencies (TransUnion) that Kirtz was behind on his payments.  Kirtz says this was false and these false statements hurt his credit report and score.  He sued the USDA under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.  The USDA moved to dismiss in District Court because on sovereign immunity grounds.  The FCRA defines "person" to include government agencies -- but the statute does not expressly abrogate sovereign immunity otherwise.  The District Court granted the USDA's motion to dismiss on these grounds.  The Third Circuit reversed.  The issue in front of the Supreme Court was whether the federal government can be sued for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, or if this is precluded on sovereign immunity grounds.   Held: A consumer may sue a federal agency for defying the FCRA’s terms.

Justice Gorsuch writing for a unanimous Court. 

 TREVOR MURRAY, PETITIONER v. UBS SECURITIES, LLC, ET AL.

As part of Trevor Murray's job at UBS, he had to file reports to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).  In these reports, he had to certify that the reports reflected his personal and independent views.  Despite physical separation from the rest of the unit, Murray claimed that he was receiving pressure from higher ups to skew his reports.  He reported these conversations and stated that he thought the pressure was illegal.   Evidently during internal discussions, UBS supervisors stated that Murray needed to be either fired or taken off the trading desk.  

About six weeks after first reporting these concerns, Murray was fired.  He sued UBS for retaliatory discharge under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  A federal jury ruled for Murray.  The jury was not instructed that UBS must have some sort of retaliatory intent.  UBS appealed.  The Second Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing for a new trial with a jury instruction requiring a finding of "retaliatory intent."  The issue in front of the Supreme Court was whether the statutory language "discriminate against an employee . . . because of ” places the burden on the whistleblower to prove that the employer  acted with “retaliatory intent" -- as the Second Circuit held.  The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the plain language of the not require a proving of this intent.  Affirmed.  Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. 

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address a circuit split -- whether Deborah Laufer has Article III standing to sue hotels that fail to include information about accessibility accommodations as required by the ADA.  She sued hundreds of hotels, most of which she never intended on trying to stay at.  After her lawyer faced sanctions, Laufer decided to voluntarily dismiss her case/s.  She asked the Supreme Court to vacate her case as moot.  Justice Barrett, writing for the Court, agreed. The judgment is vacated and remanded to the First Circuit for dismissal.  Read by Jake A. Leahy. Acheson Hotels, LLC. v. Laufer. 

In Biden v. Nebraska, the Supreme Court reviewed whether the HEROES Act authorized the Secretary of Education to unilaterally forgive $10,000 of student loans for most borrowers. The Court held that the Secretary does not have this power under HEROES Act, despite the language that allows the Secretary to "waive or modify" certain student loan provisions. Read by Jake A. Leahy.

In Department of Education v. Brown, the Supreme Court reviewed whether a person who was expecting student loan forgiveness, but not the maximum amount, had Article III standing to sue. The Court found that those individuals lacked standing to bring their challenge to the student loan forgiveness plan. Read by Jake A. Leahy.