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    Spotlight on Keynesian Economics

    enAugust 13, 2022

    About this Episode

    Its Significance

    Fifty years ago, an exuberant American people knew little and cared less about economics. They understood, however, the virtues of economic freedom, and this understanding was shared by the economists, who supplemented common sense with sharper tools of analysis.

    At present, economics seems to be the number one American and world problem. The newspapers are filled with complex discussions of the budget, wages and prices, foreign loans, and production. Present-day economists greatly add to the confusion of the public. The eminent Professor X says that his plan is the only cure for world economic evils; the equally eminent Professor Y claims that this is nonsense—so whirls the merry-go-round.

    However, one school of thought—the Keynesian—has succeeded in capturing the great majority of economists. Keynesian economics—proudly proclaiming itself as "modern," though with its roots deep in medieval and mercantilist thought—offers itself to the world as the panacea for our economic troubles. Keynesians claim, with supreme confidence, that they have "discovered" what determines the volume of employment at any given time. They assert that unemployment can be readily cured through governmental deficit spending, and that inflation can be checked by means of government tax surpluses.

    With great intellectual arrogance, Keynesians brush aside all opposition as being "reactionary," "old-fashioned," etc. They are extremely boastful of having gained the allegiance of all the young economists—a claim that has, unfortunately, a good deal of truth. Keynesian thinking has flourished in the New Deal, in the statements of President Truman, his Council of Economic Advisers, Henry Wallace, labor unions, most of the press, all foreign governments and United Nations committees, and, to a surprising extent, among "enlightened businessmen" of the Committee for Economic Development variety.

    Against this onslaught, many sincere liberal-minded citizens have been swayed by the Keynesians—particularly by their argument that the wide governmental intervention they advocate will "solve the problem of unemployment." The most dismaying aspect of the situation is that the Keynesian arguments have not been countered effectively by the liberal economists, who have generally been helpless in the tidal wave. Liberal economists have confined their attacks to the political program of the Keynesians—they have not dealt adequately with the economic theory on which this program is based. As a result, the Keynesians' claim that their program will insure full employment has largely gone unchallenged.

    The reason for this weakness on the part of liberal economists is understandable. They were brought up on "neoclassical economics," which is grounded on careful analysis of economic realities and based on the actions of individual units in the economic system. The Keynesian theory is based on a model of the economic system—a model that drastically oversimplifies reality and yet is extremely complex because of its abstract and mathematical nature. For this reason, liberal economists found themselves confused and bewildered by this "new" economics. Since Keynesians were the only economists equipped to discuss their system, they were easily able to convince the younger economists and students of its superiority.

    To launch a successful counterattack against the Keynesian invasion, therefore, requires more than righteous indignation toward the proposals for government action in the Keynesian program. It requires a well-informed citizenry who thoroughly understand the Keynesian theory itself, with its numerous fallacies, unrealistic assumptions, and faulty concepts. For this reason it will be necessary to tread a difficult path through a complex maze of technical jargon in order to examine the Keynesian model in some detail.

    Another difficulty in the task of examining Keynesianism is the sharp difference of opinion between various branches of the movement. All shades of Keynesians, however, agree in sharing a common attitude towards the function of the State, and all accept the Keynesian model as a basis for analyzing the economic situation.

    All Keynesians conceive of the State as a great potential reservoir of benefits, ready to be tapped. The prime concern for the Keynesian is to decide on economic policy—what should be the economic ends of the State and what means should the State adopt to achieve them? The State is, of course, always synonymous with "we": What should "we" do to insure full employment? is a favorite query. (Whether the "we" refers to the "people" or to the Keynesians themselves is never quite made clear.)

    In medieval and early modern times, the ancestors of the Keynesians who advocated similar policies also proclaimed that the State could do no wrong. At that time, the king and his nobles were the rulers of the State. Now we have the dubious privilege of periodically choosing our rulers from two sets of power-thirsty aspirants. That makes it a "democracy."This does not imply that democracy is evil. It means that democracy should be considered as a desirable technique for choosing rulers competitively, so long as the power of these rulers is strictly limited. So, the rulers of the State, being "democratically elected" and therefore representing the "people," are allegedly entitled to control the economic system and coerce, cajole, "influence," and redistribute the wealth of their reluctant subjects.

    A recent important illustration of Keynesian political thinking was the Truman message vetoing income tax reduction. The main reason for the veto was that high taxes are necessary to "check inflation," since a "boom" period calls for a budget surplus to "drain off excess purchasing power."

    Superficially, this argument seems convincing, and it is supported by almost all economists, including many non-Keynesian conservatives. They are all very proud of the fact that they are opposing the "politically easy" route of reducing taxes in the interests of scientific truth, national welfare, and the "fight against inflation."

    It is necessary, however, to analyze the problem more closely. What is the essence of inflation? It consists of rising prices—some prices rising more rapidly than others.The cause of rising prices is generally an abundance of fiat money created by past or present government deficits. What is a price? It is a sum of money (general purchasing power) paid voluntarily by one individual to another in exchange for a definite service rendered by the second individual to the first. This service may be in the form of a tangible commodity or an intangible benefit.

    On the other hand, what is a tax? A tax is the coercive expropriation of the property of an individual by the rulers of the State. The rulers use this property for whatever purposes they desire—usually the rulers will distribute it in such a manner as to insure their continuance in office, i.e., by subsidizing favored groups. In addition, the rulers decide which individuals will pay the taxes—the decision consisting of expropriating the property of groups disliked by the rulers.

    A price, therefore, is a free act of voluntary exchange between two individuals, both of whom benefit by the exchange (else the exchange would not be made!). A tax is a compulsory act of expropriation, with no benefit accruing to the individual (unless he happens to be on the receiving end of property expropriated by the State from someone else).

    In the light of this distinction, advocating high taxes to prevent high prices is similar to a highway robber assuring the victim that his robbery is checking inflation, since the robber doesn't intend on spending the money for quite some time or that the robber might use it to repay his own debts. When will the American people wake up to the realization that robbery only benefits the robber, and that the edict "thou shalt not steal" applies to rulers (and Keynesians) as well as to anybody else?

    The Model Explained

    The Keynesian theory (or model) highly oversimplifies the real world by dealing with a few large aggregates, lumping together the activity of all individuals in a nation.

    The basic concept used is aggregate national income, which is defined as equal to the money value of the national output of goods and services during a given time period. It is also equal to the aggregate of income received by individuals during the period (including undistributed corporate profits).

    Now, the fundamental equation of the Keynesian system is aggregate income = aggregate expenditures. The only way any individual can receive any money income is for some other individual to spend an equal sum. Conversely, every act of expenditure by an individual results in an equivalent money income for someone else. This is obviously, and always, true. Mr. Smith spends one dollar in Mr. Jones's grocery—this act results in one dollar of income for Mr. Jones. Mr. Smith receives his annual income as a result of an act of expenditure by the XYZ Company; the XYZ Company receives its annual income as a result of expenditures made by all its customers, etc. In every case, expenditures, and only expenditures, can create money income.

    Aggregate expenditures are classified into two basic types: (1) final expenditure for goods and services that have been produced during the period equals consumption, and (2) expenditure on the means of production of these goods equals investment. Thus, money income is created by decisions to spend, consisting of consumption decisions and investment decisions.

    Now, an individual, upon receiving his income, divides it between consumption and saving. Saving, in the Keynesian system, is defined simply as not spending on consumption. A fundamental Keynesian tenet is that, for any particular level of aggregate income, there is a certain definite, predictable amount that will be consumed and a definite amount that will be saved. This relationship between aggregate income and consumption is considered to be stable, fixed by the habits of consumers. In the mathematical Keynesian jargon, aggregate consumption (and therefore aggregate savings) is a stable, passive function of income (the famous consumption function). For example, we shall use the consumption function: consumption = 90 percent of income. (This is a highly simplified function, but it serves to illustrate the basic principles of the Keynesian model.) In this case, the savings function would be savings = 10 percent of income.

    Consumption expenditures are, therefore, passively determined by the level of national income. Investment expenditures, however, are, according to the Keynesians, effected independently of the national income. At this stage, what determines investment is not important—the crucial point is that it is determined independently of the income level.

    We have left out two factors that also determine the level of expenditures. If exports are greater than imports, the total amount of expenditures in a country is increased, hence national income increases. Also, a government budget deficit increases aggregate expenditures and income (provided that other types of expenditure can be assumed to be constant). Setting aside the foreign trade problem, it is obvious that government deficits or surpluses are, like investment, decided independently of the level of national income.

    Thus, income = independent expenditures (private investment + government deficit) + passive consumption expenditures. Using our illustrative consumption function, income = independent expenditures + 90 percent of income. Now, by simple arithmetic, income equals ten times independent expenditures. For every increase in independent expenditures, there will be a ten-fold increase in income. Similarly, a decrease in independent expenditures will lead to a ten-fold drop in income. This "multiplier" effect on income will be achieved by any type of independent expenditure—whether private investment or government deficit. Thus, in the Keynesian model, government deficits and private investment have the same economic effect.

    Let us now examine in detail the process whereby an equilibrium income is determined in the Keynesian model. The equilibrium level is the level at which national income tends to settle.

    Let us assume that aggregate income = 100, consumption = 90, savings = 10, and investment = 10. Also assume that there is no government deficit or surplus. For the Keynesians, this situation is a position of equilibrium—income tends to remain at 100. A position of equilibrium is reached because both main groups in the economy—business firms and consumers—are satisfied. Business firms, in the aggregate, pay out 100. Of this 100, 10 is invested in capital and 90 is paid out while producing consumers' goods. Aggregate business firms expect this 90 to be returned to them through the sale of consumers' goods. The consumers fulfill the expectations of business firms by dividing the income of 100 into consuming 90 and saving 10. Thus, aggregate business firms are just satisfied with the situation, and aggregate consumers are satisfied because they are consuming 90 percent of their income and saving 10 percent.

    Now, let independent expenditures increase to 20, either because of an increase in private investment or because of a government deficit. Now, income payments to consumers is 90 + 20 = 110. Consumers, receiving 110, will wish to consume 90 percent of it, or 99, and save 11. Now, business firms, who had expected a consumption of 90, are pleasantly surprised to see consumers bidding up prices and reducing merchants' stocks in an effort to consume 99. As a result, business firms expand their output of consumer goods to 99 and pay out 99 + 20 = 119, expecting a return of 99 in consumption sales. But again they are pleasantly surprised, since consumers will wish to spend 90 percent of 119, or 107. This process of expansion continues until income is again equal to ten times investment—when consumption is again equal to 90 percent of income. The point will be reached when income = 200, investment = 20, consumption = 180, and saving = 20.

    It is important to notice that equilibrium was reached in both cases when aggregate investment = aggregate saving. The above equilibrium process can be described in terms of saving and investment: When investment is greater than saving, the economy expands and national income rises until aggregate saving equals aggregate investment. Similarly, the economy contracts if investment is less than saving, until they are again equal.

    Note that two very important things must remain constant in order that equilibrium be reached. The consumption function (and therefore the savings function) is assumed to be constant throughout while the level of investment is constant at least until equilibrium is reached. The question now arises: what is so important about aggregate money income that it should be the continual focus of attention? Before this question can be answered, it is necessary to make certain assumptions.

    Assume that the following things be considered as given (or constant): the existing state of all techniques, the existing efficiency, quantity, and distribution of all labor, the existing quantity and quality of all equipment, the existing distribution of national income, the existing structure of relative prices, the existing money wage rates (!), and the existing structure of consumer tastes, natural resources, and economic and political institutions.

    Then, given these assumptions, for every level of national money income, there corresponds a unique, definite volume of employment. The higher the national income, the greater will be the volume of employment, until a state of "full employment" is reached. (We can define full employment as simply a very low level of unemployment.) After the full-employment level is reached, a higher money income will represent only a rise in prices, with no rise in physical output (real income) and employment.

    Summing up the above model, known as the Keynesian theory of underemployment equilibrium: To each level of national income there corresponds a unique level of employment. There is, therefore, a certain level of income to which corresponds a state of full employment, without a great rise in prices. An income below this "full-employment" income will signify large-scale unemployment; an income above will mean large price inflation.

    The level of income, in a private enterprise system, is determined by the level of independent investment expenditures and consumption expenditures that are a passive function of the income level. The resulting level of income will tend to settle at the point where aggregate investment equals aggregate saving.

    Now (and here is the grand Keynesian climax), there is no reason whatsoever to assume that this equilibrium level of income determined in the free market will coincide with the "full-employment" income level—it may be more or less.

    This is the model of the private economy accepted by all Keynesians. The State, assert the Keynesians, has the responsibility of keeping the economic system at the "full-employment" income level, since "we" cannot depend on the private economy to do so.

    The Keynesian model furnishes the means by which the State can fulfill this task. Since government deficits have the same effects on income as does private investment, all that the State must do is to estimate the expected equilibrium income level of the private economy. If it is below the "full-employment" level, the State can engage in deficit spending until the desired income level is reached. Similarly, if it is above the desired level, the State can engage in budget surpluses through high taxes. The State, if it so desires, can also stimulate or discourage private investment or consumption via taxes and subsidies, or impose tariffs if it desires to create an export surplus. The favorite Keynesian prescription for stimulating consumption is progressive income taxation, since the "rich" do most of the saving. The favorite method of "encouraging private investment" is to subsidize "progressive" and "enlightened" industrialists as against "Tory big business."

    The Model Criticized

    We remember that for the Keynesian model to be valid, the two basic determinants of income, namely, the consumption function and independent investment, must remain constant long enough for the equilibrium of income to be reached and maintained. At the very least, it must be possible for these two variables to remain constant, even if they are not generally constant in actuality. The core of the basic fallacy of the Keynesian system is, however, that it is impossible for these variables to remain constant for the required length of time.

    We recall that when income = 100, consumption = 90, savings = 10, and investment = 10, the system is supposed to be in equilibrium, because the aggregate expectations of business firms and the public are fulfilled. In the aggregate, both groups are just satisfied with the situation, so that there is allegedly no tendency for the income level to change. But aggregates are meaningful only in the world of arithmetic, not in the real world. Business firms may receive in the aggregate just what they had expected; but this does not mean that any single firm is necessarily in an equilibrium position. Business firms do not make earnings in the aggregate. Some firms may be making windfall profits, while others may be making unexpected losses. Regardless of the fact that, in the aggregate, these profits and losses may cancel each other, and each firm will have to make its own adjustments to its own particular experience. This adjustment will vary widely from firm to firm and industry to industry. In this situation, the level of investment cannot remain at 10, and the consumption function will not remain fixed, so that the level of income must change. Nothing in the Keynesian system, however, can tell us how far or in what direction any of these variables will move.

    Similarly, in the Keynesian theory of the adjustment process toward the level of equilibrium, if aggregate investment is greater than aggregate saving, the economy is supposed to expand toward the level of income where aggregate saving equals aggregate investment. In the very process of expansion, however, the consumption (and savings) function cannot remain constant. Windfall profits will be distributed unevenly (and in an unknown fashion) among the numerous business firms, thus leading to varying types of adjustments. These adjustments may lead to an unknown increase in the volume of investment. Also, under the impetus of expansion, new firms will enter the economic system, thus changing the level of investment.

    In addition, as income expands, the distribution of income among individuals in the economic system necessarily changes. It is an important fact, usually overlooked, that the Keynesian assumption of a rigid consumption function assumes a given distribution of income. Therefore, the change in the distribution of income will cause change of unknown direction and magnitude in the consumption function. Furthermore, the undoubted emergence of capital gains will change the consumption function.

    Thus, since the basic Keynesian determinants of income—the consumption function and the level of investment—cannot remain constant, they cannot determine any equilibrium level of income, even approximately. There is no point toward which income will move or at which it will tend to remain. All we can say is that there will be a complex movement in the variables of an unknown direction and degree.

    This failure of the Keynesian model is a direct result of misleading aggregative concepts. Consumption is not just a function of income; it depends, in a complex fashion, on the level of past income, expected future income, the phase of the business cycle, the length of the time period under discussion, on prices of commodities, on capital gains or losses, and on the cash balances of consumers.

    Furthermore, the breakdown of the economic system into a few aggregates assumes that these aggregates are independent of each other, that they are determined independently and can change independently. This overlooks the great amount of interdependence and interaction among the aggregates. Thus, saving is not independent of investment; most of it, particularly business saving, is made in anticipation of future investment. Therefore, a change in the prospects for profitable investment will have a great influence on the savings function, and hence on the consumption function. Similarly, investment is influenced by the level of income, by the expected course of future income, by anticipated consumption, and by the flow of savings. For example, a fall in savings will mean a cut in the funds available for investment, thus restricting investment.

    A further illustration of the fallacy of aggregates is the Keynesian assumption that the State can simply add or subtract its expenditures from that of the private economy. This assumes that private investment decisions remain constant, unaffected by government deficits or surpluses. There is no basis whatsoever for this assumption. In addition, progressive income taxation, which is designed to encourage consumption, is assumed to have no effect on private investment. This cannot be true, since, as we have already noted, a restriction of savings will reduce investment.

    Thus, aggregative economics is a drastic misrepresentation of reality. The aggregates are merely an arithmetic cloak over the real world, where multitudes of firms and individuals react and interact in a highly complex manner. The alleged "basic determinants" of the Keynesian system are themselves determined by complex interactions within and between these aggregates.

    Our analysis is confirmed by the fact that the Keynesians have been completely unsuccessful in their attempts to establish an actual, stable consumption function. Statistics bear out the fact that the consumption function shifts considerably with the month of the year, the phase of the business cycle, and over the long run. Consumer habits have definitely changed over the years. In the short run, a change in family income will only lead to a change in consumption after a lag of a certain period of time. In other cases, changes in consumption may be induced by expected changes in income (e.g., consumer credit). This instability of the consumption function eliminates the possibility of any validity of the Keynesian model.

    Still another fundamental fallacy in the Keynesian system is the assumed unique relation between income and employment. This relation depends, as we have noted above, upon the assumption that techniques, the quantity and quality of equipment, and the efficiency and wage rate of labor are fixed. This assumption leaves out factors of basic importance in economic life and can only be true over an extremely short period. Keynesians, however, attempt to use this relation over long periods as a basis for predicting the volume of employment. One direct result was the Keynesian fiasco of predicting eight million unemployed after the end of the war.

    The most important device that insures the unique relation between income and employment is the assumption of constant money wage rates. This means that in the Keynesian model, an increase in expenditures can only increase employment if money wage rates do not rise. In other words, employment can only increase if real wage rates fall (wage rates relative to prices and to profits). Also, there cannot be an equilibrium level of large-scale unemployment in the Keynesian model unless money wage rates are rigid and are not free to fall.

    This result is extremely interesting, since classical economists have always maintained that employment will only increase if real wage rates fall, and that large-scale unemployment can only persist if wage rates are prevented from falling by monopolistic interference in the labor market. Both Keynesians and liberal economists recognize that money wage rates, particularly since the advent of the New Deal, are no longer free to fall due to monopolistic governmental and trade-union control of the labor market.

    Keynesians would remedy this situation by deceiving unions into accepting lower real wage rates, while prices and profits rise via government deficit spending. They propose to accomplish this feat by relying on trade-union ignorance, coupled with frequent appeals to a "sense of responsibility by the labor leadership." In these days when unions emit cries of anguish and threaten to strike at every sign of higher prices or larger profits, such an attitude is incredibly naive. Far from having a sense of responsibility, the aim of most unions seems to be wage rates that increase rapidly and continuously, lower prices, and nonexistent profits.

    It is evident that the liberal solution of reestablishing a freely competitive labor market through the elimination of union monopolies and governmental interference is an essential requisite for the rapid disappearance of unemployment as it arises in the economic system.

    Keynesians, particularly those who are rabid partisans of the "liberal-labor movement", attempt to refute this solution by contending that cuts in money wage rates would not 1ead to a reduction of unemployment. They claim that wage-incomes would be reduced, thereby reducing consumer demand, and lowering prices, leaving real wage rates at their previous level.

    This argument rests on a confusion between wage rates and wage incomes. A reduction in money wage rates, particularly in industries where wage rates have been most rigid, will lead immediately to an increase in hours worked and the number of men employed. (Of course, the amount of the increase will vary from industry to industry.) In this way, the total payroll is increased, thus increasing wage incomes and consumer demand. A fall in money wage rates will have an especially favorable employment effect in the construction and capital-goods industries. It is just these industries that now have the strongest unions.

    Furthermore, if wage incomes are reduced, then the incomes of entrepreneurs and others will be increased and total "purchasing power" in the community will not decline.

    The "Mature Economy"

    It is important to recall that Keynesianism was born and was able to capture its widespread following under the impetus of the Great Depression of the thirties, a depression unique in its length and severity, and, especially, in the persistence of large-scale unemployment. It was its attempt to furnish an explanation for the events of the thirties that gained Keynesianism its popular following. Using a model with assumptions that restrict its application to a very short period of time, and completely fallacious in its dependence on simple aggregates, all Keynesians confidently ordered government deficits as the cure.

    In interpreting the significance of the Depression, however, Keynesians part company. "Moderates" maintain that it was simply a severe depression in the familiar round of business cycles. "Radical" Keynesians, headed by Professor Hansen of Harvard, assert that the thirties ushered in an era in the United States of "secular (long-run) stagnation." They claim that the American economy is now mature, that opportunities for investment and expansion are largely ended, so that the level of investment expenditures can be expected to remain at a permanently low level, at a level too low to ever provide full employment. The cure for this situation, according to the Keynes-Hansenites, is a permanent government program of deficit expenditures on long-range projects, and heavy progressive income taxation to permanently increase consumption and discourage savings.

    Where the Hansen stagnation thesis goes beyond the Keynesian model is in its attempt to explain the determinants of the level of investment. Investment is supposed to be determined by the "extent of investment opportunities" that are, in turn, determined by (1) technological improvement, (2) the rate of population growth, and (3) the opening of new territory. The Hansenites go on to draw a gloomy picture of private investment opportunities in the modern world.

    The decade of the thirties was the first in American history with a decline in population growth, and there is no new territory to develop—the "frontier" is closed. Consequently, we can rely only on technological progress to provide investment opportunities, opportunities that have to be much greater than in the past to "make up" for the unfavorable changes in the other two factors. As for technological progress, that too is slowing down. After all, the railroads have already been built and the automobile industry has reached maturity. Whatever minor improvements there might be will probably be withheld by "reactionary monopolists," etc.

    Let us examine each of Hansen's alleged determinants of investment. The gloom concerning the lack of new lands to develop—the vanishing of the "frontier"—can be dispelled quickly. The frontier disappeared in 1890 without appreciably affecting the rapid progress and prosperity of America; obviously it can be no source of trouble now. This is borne out by the fact that, since 1890, investment per head in the older sections of America has been greater than in the recent frontier sections.

    It is difficult to see how a decline in population growth can adversely affect investment. Population growth does not provide an independent source of investment opportunity. A fall in the rate of population growth can only affect investment adversely if

    All the wants of existing consumers are completely satisfied. In that case, population growth would be the only additional source of consumer demand. This situation clearly does not exist; there are an infinite number of unsatisfied wants.

    The decline would lead to reduced consumer demand. There is no reason why this should be the case. Will not families use the money that they otherwise would have spent on their children for other types of expenditures?

    In particular, Hansen claims that the catastrophic drop in construction in the thirties was caused by the decline in population growth, which reduced the demand for new housing. The relevant factor in this connection, however, is the rate of growth in the number of families; this did not decline in the thirties. Furthermore, Manhattan has had a declining total population (not merely the rate of growth) since 1911, yet in the 1920s Manhattan had the biggest residential building boom in its history.

    Finally, if our malady is underpopulation, why has no one suggested subsidizing immigration to cure unemployment? This would have the same effect as a rise in the rate of growth of population. The fact that not even Hansen has suggested this solution is a final demonstration of the absurdity of the "population growth" argument.

    The third factor, technological progress, is certainly an important one; it is one of the main dynamic features of a free economy. Technological progress, however, is a decidedly favorable factor. It is proceeding now at a faster rate than ever before, with industries spending unprecedented sums on research and development of new techniques. New industries loom on the horizon. Certainly there is every reason to be exuberant rather than gloomy about the possibilities of technological progress.

    So much for the threat of the mature economy. We have seen that of the three alleged determinants of investment, only one is relevant, and its prospects are very favorable. The Hansen mature-economy thesis is at least as worthless an explanation of economic reality as the rest of the Keynesian apparatus.

    So ends our lengthy analysis of the most successful and pernicious hoax in the history of economic thought—Keynesianism. All of Keynesian thinking is a tissue of distortions, fallacies, and drastically unrealistic assumptions. The vicious political effects of the Keynesian program have only been briefly considered. They are only too obvious: the rulers of the State engaging in direct robbery through "progressive" taxation, creating and spending new money in competition with individuals, directing investment, "influencing" consumption—the State all-powerful, the individual helpless and throttled under the yoke. All this is in the name of "saving free enterprise". (Rare is the Keynesian who admits to being a socialist.) This is the price we are asked to pay in order to put a completely fallacious theory into effect!

    The problem of the explanation of the Great Depression, however, still remains. It is a problem that needs thorough and careful investigation; in this context, we can only indicate briefly what appear to be promising lines of inquiry. Here are some of the facts: during the decade of the thirties, new investment fell sharply (particularly in construction); consumer expenditures rose; tariffs were at a record high; unemployment remained at an abnormally high level throughout the decade; commodity prices fell; wage rates rose (particularly in construction); income taxes rose greatly and became much more sharply progressive; strikes and trade-union membership increased greatly, especially in the capital-goods industries. There was also a huge growth of federal bureaucracy, burdensome "social legislation," and the extremely hostile antibusiness attitude of the New Deal government.

    These facts indicate that the Depression was not the result of an economy that had suddenly become "mature," but of the policies of the New Deal. A free economy cannot successfully function under the constant attacks of a coercive police power. Investment is not decided according to some mystical "opportunity." It is determined by the prospects for profit and the prospects of keeping that profit. Prospects for profit depend on costs being low in relation to expected prices, and the prospects for retaining the profit depend on the lowest possible level of taxation.

    The effect of the New Deal was to drastically increase costs through building up a monopoly union movement, which led directly to increasing wage rates (even when prices were low and falling) and to lowered efficiency via "make-work," slowdowns, strikes, seniority rules, etc. Security of property was jeopardized by the continual onslaughts of the New Deal government, especially by the confiscatory taxation that dried up the needed flow of savings and left no incentive to invest productively the savings that remained. These savings, instead, found their way into purchasing government bonds to finance all types of boondoggling projects.

    Economic well-being, therefore, as well as the basic principles of morality and justice, lead to the same necessary political goal: the reestablishment of the security of private property from all forms of coercion, without which there can be no individual freedom and no lasting economic prosperity and progress.

    This report was written in 1947, and first published in 2008 by the Mises Institute.

    Recent Episodes from Interventionism

    The Importance of Hülsmann's Groundbreaking book <em>Abundance, Generosity, and the State</em>

    The Importance of Hülsmann's Groundbreaking book <em>Abundance, Generosity, and the State</em>

    Guido Hülsmann’s Abundance, Generosity, and the State provides readers with an explanation of the nature and causes of gratuitous goods. Hülsmann demonstrates how free markets are infused with both intentional and unintentional gratuity, and how the repressive and permissive interventions of the modern state lead to their destruction.

    This work is desperately needed and represents a remarkable achievement by one of the Austrian School’s leading lights of our time. It is the first successful and systematic treatment of this underappreciated category of human action. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that it belongs alongside the great advancements in economic science, and I can say, without hesitation, that it will stand alongside works such as Ludwig von Mises’s Socialism and Murray N. Rothbard’s Power and Market. The knowledge and understanding it provideseconomists and noneconomists alike is indeed a gift.

    Hülsmann breaks new ground in the political economy of gratuitous goods, which fits squarely within the field of praxeology—the theory of all human action. This subcategory of praxeology has been largely ignored, even by those in the Austrian tradition. Meanwhile, the true nature, causes, and consequences of gifts and gratuity have been badly misconstrued by social scientists outside the field of economics. Furthermore, the best and latest attempts to address the topic have all failed to properly evaluate the impact of interventionism upon the economy of gifts. Hülsmann holds up the work of Kenneth Boulding, Catherine Gbedolo, and John Mueller as providing recent and helpful contributions. But despite the best efforts of these scholars, Hülsmann acknowledges that “generosity, gifts, and unearned abundance still stand at the margins of economics.” Thankfully, Abundance, Generosity, and the State sheds new and penetrating light on the subject, and convincingly delivers a Misesian-Rothbardian vision of the nature of generosity and the predations of the state upon it in a robust work of political economy.

    As a master teacher is prone to do, Hülsmann supplies the reader with clear and concise definitions of his terms. Most importantly, he illuminates the essential nature of genuine gifts and donations, which are defined by four key conditions; namely, “the donor intends to benefit some cause or person other than himself, he does not seek any compensation, he freely consents to the transfer, and his donation consists of personal savings.” Violations of each of these conditions produce a different kind of nongift. Donors make grants rather than gifts if they seek their own private benefit, and their transfers have hidden prices if they expect reciprocity. Donors are “fleeced” if they do not actually consent to the donation, and they are merely dispensing “loot” if they do not legitimately own what they are transferring.

    These definitions are systematically carried throughout the book, providing the reader with great clarity. With these distinctions being made, the readers of this periodical may already “smell a rat”—interventionism—that is responsible for driving a great number of individuals to shift their actions from genuine generosity toward these dubious “pseudo-gifts.” This is the explicit purpose of a work in political economy—to provide a demonstration of what human action looks like under conditions of private property protection versus the conditions of life when that principle is violated by the state. The latter situation is rightly described by Hülsmann as a grim picture of a world bereft of genuine gifts and proliferating in genuine miserliness and societal atomization.

    What follows is a summary of Hülsmann’s key findings along with various attempts to illuminate their importance in furthering economic science as well as some of their implications.

    The author identifies his motive early on as an attempt to respond to Pope Benedict XVI’s encyclical Caritas in veritate (2009), which exhorted people of good will to “demonstrate, in thinking and behaviour, . . . that in commercial relationships the principle of gratuitousness and the logic of gift as an expression of fraternity can and must find their place within normal economic activity.” What Hülsmann demonstrates is that in a truly free economy, every market exchange is unintentionally infused with gratuitous goods.

    Moreover, the relationship between growing economies and generosity isn’t just a run-of-the-mill positive correlation between wealth and charity. Rather, he explains, “gratuitous goods and markets are not merely complementary but symbiotic. They feed into each other. In order to understand markets, it is necessary to grasp why and how certain economic goods are transferred without payment.”

    To further this finding, Hülsmann extends F.A. Hayek’s observations regarding the nature of market competition. Hülsmann reminds us that competition is best understood as “a process of piecemeal improvements . . . that improves the terms on which customers are served.” What emerges from this process is an unintentional, or spontaneous, gratuity. Indeed, the process of competition in an unhampered market is the mechanism through which society is freely provided with higher-quality goods at lower prices. The author further observes that “competitive behavior in Hayek’s sense entails additional benefits for other market participants. These benefits are gratuitous because in the cases Hayek envisioned, there is no obligation for individuals or firms to improve anything whatsoever and their customers do not have any right to claim such benefits. Moreover, these benefits are provided spontaneously.”

    These initial observations offer the modern reader intellectual ammunition against the age-old equivalence postulate. This Aristotelian idea still occupies the minds of many who view economic exchange as a zero-sum game. Furthermore, the reader is reminded of the fact that “as soon as they engage in an exchange, they cannot prevent the double gratuitousness that it inexorably generates.” Put another way, voluntary exchange only happens because of the improved state of affairs it yields for both participants. The implication is that in the unhampered market, there is a mutually reinforcing relationship where gratuitousness leads to more exchange and more exchange leads to greater gratuity.

    Another important takeaway from Hülsmann’s treatise is his systematic and clear distinction between genuine gifts and “pseudo-gifts.” He rightly notes that even in a free society there will be those whose hearts are duplicitous and who will extend what appear to be genuine gifts or donations while they are—as the biblical proverbs state—inwardly calculating. Such individuals are secretly counting on reciprocity while appearing to give genuine gifts that require not even the slightest form of repayment. Hülsmann refrains from making harsh judgment on the practice of reciprocity—even recognizing its importance in various cases. Indeed, he aptly observes that “reciprocation does not contradict the sacrificial nature of donations. Quite to the contrary, the particular sort of reciprocity that is found in friendship and in the loving relationships between family members can only be understood before the background of genuine sacrifice.”

    Elsewhere, Hülsmann illustrates the dangers of creating overgeneralizations about the motive of reciprocity by drawing our attention to the excesses of the works of French anthropologist Marcel Mauss and his followers, who largely contended that genuine gifts are, in fact, impossible. Mauss’s works from the early 1920s on primitive societies presented the view that “strictly speaking, there is no such thing as a pure gift at all. . . . In the real world, [Mauss] argued, all social relations are based on reciprocity, but the respective obligations cannot be final and conclusive.” It comes as no great shock, then, that Mauss and his disciples were seeking to “develop a theory of human action in deliberate opposition to economics,” motivated by their unwillingness to accept the “political (pro–free market) implications of economics.” Furthermore, the Maussians “blithely disregarded the benefits springing from property law and contracts.” In his retort, Hülsmann makes the salient observation that “it is only when each person’s obligations are clearly defined, as they tend to be in an economy based on the principle of private property, that it becomes possible to do something beyond and in excess of one’s obligations. Only then do genuine gifts become conceivable. Only then does true gratuitousness become a reality.”

    Of course, while humans always have been and will ever remain less than divine in their motives in all things, this problem of the aforementioned “pseudo-gifts” will also always exist. This is not in question. However, the task of the political economist is to demonstrate the contrast between the economics of donations under private property and under interventionism.

    Hülsmann does just that by building on some of his earlier works to explain the impacts of repressive and permissive interventionism on generosity. The former include taxation, prohibition, and regulation, which all “curb the citizens’ exercise of their ordinary property rights” and have the effect of ruining individual initiative. The latter create special classes of people who are protected and indeed encouraged to engage in “irresponsibility and outright frivolous behavior.”

    As is Hülsmann’s wonderful habit, he points to monetary interventionism as a devastating form of permissive interventionism. By manipulating money and credit, the state creates the conditions for an inflation culture. In it, rationality traps and intervention spirals are to be expected, although they may emerge slowly. Hülsmann rightly observes that as this culture begins to take hold, “the willingness to make donations of time and material goods is compromised. Less time is spent on disinterested activities, whether reading, music, sports, education of one’s children, worship, or spending time with others.”

    Monetary interventionism’s antisocial effects cannot be ignored, especially when people are increasingly stingy in sharing time with their children, faith community, or civic organizations— all things enjoyed for their own sake. These aren’t the only things that Hülsmann reminds us that we’ve lost under this statist invention. Indeed, trust, social cohesion, and friendship itself, the normal gifts of life, have eroded.

    In stark contrast to the pernicious effects of monetary interventionism upon the gift economy is the reality of the unhampered market for money. Professor Hülsmann reminds his readers that in the unhampered market money hoarding has gratuitous effects. Indeed, when this occurs, the price level falls and bystanders who expected to pay more for goods find themselves in an environment of falling prices. It is easy to see that this state of affairs benefits those who do not hoard their money, and the benefits do not stop there! With this newly increased purchasing power, people are more likely to give genuine gifts. We have more beautiful displays of shared wealth because of the gratuitous effects of money hoarding. Hülsmann also reminds us that in a free market, free of monetary interventionism, there will tend to be a higher tendency to save and invest, leading to lower returns on capital investment, and the wealthiest members of society will be more likely to make genuine sacrifices. This form of sacrifice is “a chosen abundance of economic goods that could very well be used for self-gratification. The donor deliberately limits the personal use of his resources.” For all the talk of how capitalism and free markets lead to consumerism, frivolity, waste, avarice, and insatiable greed, Hülsmann provides us with a clear-headed and coherent argument for why just the opposite is true. Indeed, it’s the unhampered market—bolstered by virtuous people who shun the promise of power that comes with interventionism—that enables people to live free and to live generously.

    Unfortunately, the permissive forms of interventionism aren’t the only ones lurking in the shadows of statism. The repressive forms of interventionism are no less destructive to generosity and the economy of gifts. Hülsmann powerfully illustrates how the repression of taxation—just one form of repressive intervention—creates conflicts of interest between “tax payers and tax receivers; the government and the citizens; employers and employees; men and women; blacks and whites; old retirees and young professionals.” This observation highlights the importance of recognizing that it is the tax authority itself that must be abolished in order to end what has truly become a war of all against all. This war is not the result of the natural free state of men, but rather is an imposition that destroys friendship, fellowship, and kinship. When the full effects of taxation have taken hold, the author observes, atomized and disintegrated individuals must “organize themselves in order to obtain power sufficient to loot others or to fend off other looters . . . the characteristic friendship of repressive interventionism is the robber gang.” The inexorable descent of many Western cities into politically generated tribal chaos provides a disquieting glimpse of repressive intervention in action.

    The author makes yet another contribution to the economics of generosity by referring to the works of Hans-Hermann Hoppe and Gordon Tullock. At various points, Hülsmann also reminds us that interventionism—especially under democratic systems—contributes to the creation of an entire political class that is sustained by the “hidden prices” that are imposed on the public. Some of the clearest examples of this reality can be clearly seen in the welfare-warfare state apparatus that provides the pseudo-gift of subsidies in exchange for political loyalty. Of course, the modern state continues to use its propaganda machine to “fleece” the public by encouraging them to give up their private wealth as a way to pay their “fair share” or exhibit true patriotism. All the while, the political class enriches itself and distributes the “loot” among the favored few. Indeed, these activities are clearly harmful to the public and as such are properly regarded as a gratuitous evil. Hülsmann in his notably moderate tone of writing never claims that excessive, unreasonable harm is impossible in the free market. However, he reminds the reader that “gratuitous evil is as a rule intentional and can be a regular and permanent side effect of human action only in exceptional circumstances (under a corrupted legal and political order).” Gratuitous evil comes about more frequently under permissive intervention, and Hülsmann reminds us that this is “not an accident, but the natural tendency of modern democratic systems. By the very logic of modern electoral politics, the welfare state is not likely to help the poor. It is likely to impoverish them further.”

    The findings of Abundance, Generosity, and the State have completely unseated the notion of positive externalities as a market failure and completely dispensed with externality theory as a whole. What have been regarded by mainstream economists as “spillovers,” “positive externalities,” and “network effects,” as so-called market failures, are no failures at all. Indeed, the author clearly demonstrates—as noted earlier—that gratuitous goods have a symbiotic relationship with all market exchanges. Furthermore, gratuitous bads are minimized and gratuitous evils dismissed when permissive and repressive interventions are abolished. It should be abundantly clear to keen observers of the interventionist state that externality theory is one of the most important plausible fallacies that the state uses to entrance the public into acquiescing to its power. By toppling this falsehood and upholding the goodness that emerges from genuinely free exchange, Hülsmann has perhaps made a more generous and benevolent future more possible.

    I would be remiss if I failed to mention that the excellence of this treatise is exceeded by the excellence of the man himself. Guido Hülsmann has embodied intentional generosity to his students, and to all those who serve, study, and speak with the goal that liberty, beauty, virtue, and truth may prevail in our time. It is true that the science of economics has been advanced through this work. Indeed, some of the most noxious and long-lasting economic doctrines that uphold the interventionist state—the equivalence postulate, the zero-sum game fallacy, and externality theory—have been cut down to size by Hülsmann’s mighty pen. Furthermore, the importance of this treatise is readily recognizable: it lies primarily in its clear demonstration that the interventionist state is at the root of Western society’s increasingly loathsome, self-destructive, and stingy culture. The author has given a gift of new economic knowledge, and those fortunate enough to know him have the even greater gift of knowing and experiencing his gratuitous kindness and friendship. Bravo, Professor!

    The Myth of the Failure of Capitalism

    The Myth of the Failure of Capitalism

    [This essay was originally published as "Die Legende von Versagen des Kapitalismus" in Der Internationale Kapitalismus und die Krise, Festschrift für Julius Wolf (1932)This essay was translated from the German by Jane E. Sanders, who wishes to gratefully acknowledge the comments and suggestions of Professor John T. Sanders, Rochester Institute of Technology, and Professor David R. Henderson, University of Rochester, in the preparation of the translation.

     

    The nearly universal opinion expressed these days is that the economic crisis of recent years marks the end of capitalism. Capitalism allegedly has failed, has proven itself incapable of solving economic problems, and so mankind has no alternative, if it is to survive, then to make the transition to a planned economy, to socialism.

    This is hardly a new idea. The socialists have always maintained that economic crises are the inevitable result of the capitalistic method of production and that there is no other means of eliminating economic crises than the transition to socialism. If these assertions are expressed more forcefully these days and evoke greater public response, it is not because the present crisis is greater or longer than its predecessors, but rather primarily because today public opinion is much more strongly influenced by socialist views than it was in previous decades.

    1.

    When there was no economic theory, the belief was that whoever had power and was determined to use it could accomplish anything. In the interest of their spiritual welfare and with a view toward their reward in heaven, rulers were admonished by their priests to exercise moderation in their use of power. Also, it was not a question of what limits the inherent conditions of human life and production set for this power, but rather that they were considered boundless and omnipotent in the sphere of social affairs.

    The foundation of social sciences, the work of a large number of great intellects, of whom David Hume and Adam Smith are most outstanding, has destroyed this conception. One discovered that social power was a spiritual one and not (as was supposed) a material and, in the rough sense of the word, a real one. And there was the recognition of a necessary coherence within market phenomena which power is unable to destroy. There was also a realization that something was operative in social affairs that the powerful could not influence and to which they had to accommodate themselves, just as they had to adjust to the laws of nature. In the history of human thought and science there is no greater discovery.

    If one proceeds from this recognition of the laws of the market, economic theory shows just what kind of situation arises from the interference of force and power in market processes. The isolated intervention cannot reach the end the authorities strive for in enacting it and must result in consequences which are undesirable from the standpoint of the authorities. Even from the point of view of the authorities themselves the intervention is pointless and harmful. Proceeding from this perception, if one wants to arrange market activity according to the conclusions of scientific thought — and we give thought to these matters not only because we are seeking knowledge for its own sake, but also because we want to arrange our actions such that we can reach the goals we aspire to — one then comes unavoidably to a rejection of such interventions as superfluous, unnecessary, and harmful, a notion which characterizes the liberal teaching. It is not that liberalism wants to carry standards of value over into science; it wants to take from science a compass for market actions. Liberalism uses the results of scientific research in order to construct society in such a way that it will be able to realize as effectively as possible the purposes it is intended to realize. The politico-economic parties do not differ on the end result for which they strive but on the means they should employ to achieve their common goal. The liberals are of the opinion that private property in the means of production is the only way to create wealth for everyone, because they consider socialism impractical and because they believe that the system of interventionism (which according to the view of its advocates is between capitalism and socialism) cannot achieve its proponents' goals.

    The liberal view has found bitter opposition. But the opponents of liberalism have not been successful in undermining its basic theory nor the practical application of this theory. They have not sought to defend themselves against the crushing criticism which the liberals have leveled against their plans by logical refutation; instead they have used evasions. The socialists considered themselves removed from this criticism, because Marxism has declared inquiry about the establishment and the efficacy of a socialist commonwealth heretical; they continued to cherish the socialist state of the future as heaven on earth, but refused to engage in a discussion of the details of their plan. The interventionists chose another path. They argued, on insufficient grounds, against the universal validity of economic theory. Not in a position to dispute economic theory logically, they could refer to nothing other than some "moral pathos," of which they spoke in the invitation to the founding meeting of the Vereins für Sozialpolitik [Association for Social Policy] in Eisenach. Against logic they set moralism, against theory emotional prejudice, against argument the reference to the will of the state.

    Economic theory predicted the effects of interventionism and state and municipal socialism exactly as they happened. All the warnings were ignored. For 50 or 60 years the politics of European countries has been anticapitalist and antiliberal. More than 40 years ago Sidney Webb (Lord Passfield) wrote,

    it can now fairly be claimed that the socialist philosophy of to-day is but the conscious and explicit assertion of principles of social organization which have been already in great part unconsciously adopted. The economic history of the century is an almost continuous record of the progress of Socialism.Cf. Webb, Fabian Essays in Socialism.… Ed. by G. Bernard Shaw. (American ed., edited by H.G. Wilshire. New York: The Humboldt Publishing Co., 1891) p. 4.

    That was at the beginning of this development and it was in England where liberalism was able for the longest time to hold off the anticapitalistic economic policies. Since then interventionist policies have made great strides. In general the view today is that we live in an age in which the "hampered economy" reigns — as the forerunner of the blessed socialist collective consciousness to come.

    Now, because indeed that which economic theory predicted has happened, because the fruits of the anticapitalistic economic policies have come to light, a cry is heard from all sides: this is the decline of capitalism, the capitalistic system has failed!

    Liberalism cannot be deemed responsible for any of the institutions which give today's economic policies their character. It was against the nationalization and the bringing under municipal control of projects which now show themselves to be catastrophes for the public sector and a source of filthy corruption; it was against the denial of protection for those willing to work and against placing state power at the disposal of the trade unions, against unemployment compensation, which has made unemployment a permanent and universal phenomenon, against social insurance, which has made those insured into grumblers, malingers, and neurasthenics, against tariffs (and thereby implicitly against cartels), against the limitation of freedom to live, to travel, or study where one likes, against excessive taxation and against inflation, against armaments, against colonial acquisitions, against the oppression of minorities, against imperialism and against war. It put up stubborn resistance against the politics of capital consumption. And liberalism did not create the armed party troops who are just waiting for the convenient opportunity to start a civil war.

    2.

    The line of argument that leads to blaming capitalism for at least some of these things is based on the notion that entrepreneurs and capitalists are no longer liberal but interventionist and statist. The fact is correct, but the conclusions people want to draw from it are wrong-headed. These deductions stem from the entirely untenable Marxist view that entrepreneurs and capitalists protected their special class interests through liberalism during the time when capitalism flourished but now, in the late and declining period of capitalism, protect them through interventionism. This is supposed to be proof that the "hampered economy" of interventionism is the historically necessary economics of the phase of capitalism in which we find ourselves today. But the concept of classical political economy and of liberalism as the ideology (in the Marxist sense of the word) of the bourgeoisie is one of the many distorted techniques of Marxism. If entrepreneurs and capitalists were liberal thinkers around 1800 in England and interventionist, statist, and socialist thinkers around 1930 in Germany, the reason is that entrepreneurs and capitalists were also captivated by the prevailing ideas of the times. In 1800 no less than in 1930 entrepreneurs had special interests which were protected by interventionism and hurt by liberalism.

    Today the great entrepreneurs are often cited as "economic leaders." Capitalistic society knows no "economic leaders." Therein lies the characteristic difference between socialist economies on the one hand and capitalist economies on the other hand: in the latter, the entrepreneurs and the owners of the means of production follow no leadership save that of the market. The custom of citing initiators of great enterprises as economic leaders already gives some indication that these days it is not usually the case that one reaches these positions by economic successes but rather by other means.

    In the interventionist state it is no longer of crucial importance for the success of an enterprise that operations be run in such a way that the needs of the consumer are satisfied in the best and least expensive way; it is much more important that one has "good relations" with the controlling political factions, that the interventions redound to the advantage and not the disadvantage of the enterprise. A few more marks' worth of tariff protection for the output of the enterprise, a few marks less tariff protection for the inputs in the manufacturing process can help the enterprise more than the greatest prudence in the conduct of operations. An enterprise may be well run, but it will go under if it does not know how to protect its interests in the arrangement of tariff rates, in the wage negotiations before arbitration boards, and in governing bodies of cartels. It is much more important to have "connections" than to produce well and cheaply. Consequently the men who reach the top of such enterprises are not those who know how to organize operations and give production a direction which the market situation demands, but rather men who are in good standing both "above" and "below," men who know how to get along with the press and with all political parties, especially with the radicals, such that their dealings cause no offense. This is that class of general directors who deal more with federal dignitaries and party leaders than with those from whom they buy or to whom they sell.

    Because many ventures depend on political favors, those who undertake such ventures must repay the politicians with favors. There has been no big venture in recent years which has not had to expend considerable sums for transactions which from the outset were clearly unprofitable but which, despite expected losses, had to be concluded for political reasons. This is not to mention contributions to non-business concerns — election funds, public welfare institutions, and the like.

    Powers working toward the independence of the directors of the large banks, industrial concerns, and joint-stock companies from the stockholders are asserting themselves more strongly. This politically expedited "tendency for big businesses to socialize themselves," that is, for letting interests other than the regard "for the highest possible yield for the stockholders" determine the management of the ventures, has been greeted by statist writers as a sign that we have already vanquished capitalism.Cf. Keynes, "The End of Laisser-Faire," 1926, see, Essays in Persuasion (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1932) pp. 314–315. In the course of the reform of German stock rights, even legal efforts have already been made to put the interest and well-being of the entrepreneur, namely "his economic, legal, and social self-worth and lasting value and his independence from the changing majority of changing stockholders,"Cf. Passow, Der Strukturwandel der Aktiengesellcschaft im Lichte der Wirtschaftsenquente, (Jena 1939), S.4. above those of the shareholder.

    With the influence of the state behind them and supported by a thoroughly interventionist public opinion, the leaders of big enterprises today feel so strong in relation to the stockholders that they believe they need not take their interests into account. In their conduct of the businesses of society in those countries in which statism has most strongly come to rule — for example in the successor states of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire — they are as unconcerned about profitability as the directors of public utilities. The result is ruin. The theory which has been advanced says that these ventures are too large to be run simply with a view toward profit. This concept is extraordinarily opportune whenever the result of conducting business while fundamentally renouncing profitability is the bankruptcy of the enterprise. It is opportune, because at this moment the same theory demands the intervention of the state for support of enterprises which are too big to be allowed to fail.

    3.

    It is true that socialism and interventionism have not yet succeeded in completely eliminating capitalism. If they had, we Europeans, after centuries of prosperity, would rediscover the meaning of hunger on a massive scale. Capitalism is still prominent enough that new industries are coming into existence, and those already established are improving and expanding their equipment and operations. All the economic advances which have been and will be made stem from the persistent remnant of capitalism in our society. But capitalism is always harassed by the intervention of the government and must pay as taxes a considerable part of its profits in order to defray the inferior productivity of public enterprise.

    The crisis under which the world is presently suffering is the crisis of interventionism and of state and municipal socialism, in short the crisis of anticapitalist policies. Capitalist society is guided by the play of the market mechanism. On that issue there is no difference of opinion. The market prices bring supply and demand into congruence and determine the direction and extent of production. It is from the market that the capitalist economy receives its sense. If the function of the market as regulator of production is always thwarted by economic policies in so far as the latter try to determine prices, wages, and interest rates instead of letting the market determine them, then a crisis will surely develop.

    Bastiat has not failed, but rather Marx and Schmoller.

    Energy Economics

    Energy Economics

    Some principles for understanding environmental issues. Can government steer energy use decisions to improve outcomes?

    Download the slides from this lecture at Mises.org/MU23_PPT_37.

    Recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, on 28 July 2023.

    Economic Inequality

    Economic Inequality

    Inequality is a good thing in the free market. Economic equality is a disastrous government policy that leads to economic ruin for all—including the poor and workers.

    Download the slides from this lecture at Mises.org/MU23_PPT_36.

    Recorded at the Mises Institute in Auburn, Alabama, on 28 July 2023.