finanzmärkte

Die aktuelle Zinserhöhung der US-Notenbank und die Reaktion der Finanzmärkte+++Deutsche Wirtschaft appelliert an Habeck mehr zu tun+++Italiens Wirtschaft hofft auf stabile Verhältnisse+++Italiens Jugend hofft auf Jobs

Während die globale Wirtschaft eingebrochen ist, haben sich die Kapitalmärkte schnell vom Schock der ersten Covid-19-Pandemiewelle erholt. Fidelity Kapitalmarktstratege Carsten Roemheld und Andreas Telschow aus dem Privatkundenvertrieb sprechen darüber, warum sich Wirtschaft und Börsen so unterschiedlich entwickeln. Warum es an Eigenkapital und Zuversicht mangelt. Wie die wachsende Zahl passiver Investitionsstrategien die Situation verschärft. Und wie Anleger sich jetzt verhalten sollten.

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Disclaimer: Wertentwicklungen in der Vergangenheit sind keine Garantie für zukünftige Erträge und Ergebnisse. Der Wert von Anteilen kann schwanken und wird nicht garantiert. Anleger werden darauf hingewiesen, dass insbesondere Fonds, die in Schwellenländern anlegen, mit höheren Risiken behaftet sein können. Die dargestellten Standpunkte spiegeln die Einschätzung des Herausgebers wider und können sich ohne Mitteilung darüber ändern. Daten und Informationsquellen wurden als verlässlich eingestuft, jedoch nicht von unabhängiger Stelle überprüft. Eine detaillierte Beschreibung der mit den jeweiligen Fonds verbundenen Risiken finden Sie in den entsprechenden Fondsprospekten. Fidelity übernimmt keine Haftung für direkte oder indirekte Schäden und Verluste. Weitere Informationen finden Sie unter www.fidelity.de.

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Wie verlässlich sind Wirtschaftsdaten aus China gerade? Und wie könnte die Corona-Pandemie das wirtschaftliche Machtgefüge auf der Welt verändern? Darüber redet der Chinakenner Professor Sebastian Heilmann mit Fidelity Kapitalmarktstratege Carsten Roemheld.

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Disclaimer: Wertentwicklungen in der Vergangenheit sind keine Garantie für zukünftige Erträge und Ergebnisse. Der Wert von Anteilen kann schwanken und wird nicht garantiert. Anleger werden darauf hingewiesen, dass insbesondere Fonds, die in Schwellenländern anlegen, mit höheren Risiken behaftet sein können. Die dargestellten Standpunkte spiegeln die Einschätzung des Herausgebers wider und können sich ohne Mitteilung darüber ändern. Daten und Informationsquellen wurden als verlässlich eingestuft, jedoch nicht von unabhängiger Stelle überprüft. Eine detaillierte Beschreibung der mit den jeweiligen Fonds verbundenen Risiken finden Sie in den entsprechenden Fondsprospekten. Fidelity übernimmt keine Haftung für direkte oder indirekte Schäden und Verluste. Weitere Informationen finden Sie unter www.fidelity.de.

See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

This paper provides a compact framework for banking regulation analysis in the presence of uncertainty between systemic liquidity and solvency shocks. Extending the work by Cao & Illing (2009a, b), it is shown that systemic liquidity shortage arises endogenously as part of the inferior mixed strategy equilibrium. The paper compares dierent traditional regulatory policies which intend to fix the ineciencies, and argues that the co-existence of illiquidity and insolvency problems adds extra cost for banking regulation and makes some schemes that are optimal under pure illiquidity risks (such as liquidity regulation with lender of last resort policy) fail. The regulatory cost can be minimized by combining the advantages of several instruments.

The paper provides a baseline model for regulatory analysis of systemic liquidity shocks. We show that banks may have an incentive to invest excessively in illiquid long term projects. In the prevailing mixed strategy equilibrium the allocation is inferior from the investor’s point of view since some banks free-ride on the liquidity provision as a result of limited liability. The paper compares different regulatory mechanisms to cope with the externalities. It is shown that the combination of liquidity regulation ex ante and lender of last resort policy ex post is able to implement the outcome maximizing investor’s payoff. In contrast, both “narrow banking” and imposing equity requirements as buffer are inferior mechanisms for coping with systemic liquidity risk.

By using an existing and a new convergence measure, this paper assesses whether bank loan and bond interest rates are converging for the non-financial corporate sector across the euro area. Whilst we find evidence for complete bond market integration, the market for bank loans remains segmented, albeit to various degrees depending on the type and size of the loan. Factor analysis reveals that rates on large loans and small loans with long rate fixation periods have weakly converged in the sense that, up to a fixed effect, their evolution is driven by common factors only. In contrast, the price evolution of small loans with short rate fixation periods is still affected by country-specific dynamic factors. There are few signs that bank loan rates are becoming more uniform with time.

Russian banks have been strongly influenced by the worldwide financial crisis which started in the second half of 2008. This was caused by a combination of domestic, regional and international factors. We estimate an early warning model for the Russian crisis. We identified 47 Russian banks which failed after September 2008. Using the Bankscope data set, we show that balance sheet indicators were informative about possible failures of these banks as early as 2006. The early predictive indicators include especially equity, net interest revenues, return on average equity, net loans, and loan loss reserves.

When expanding abroad, a multinational bank faces a trade-off between accessing a foreign country via cross border lending or a financial foreign direct investment, i.e. greenfield or acquisition entry. We analyze the entry mode choice of multinational banks and explicitly derive the entry mode pattern in the banking industry. Moreover, we show that in less developed banking markets, a trend towards cross border lending and acquisition entry exists. Greenfield entry prevails in more developed markets. Furthermore, we identify a tendency towards acquisition entry in small and towards greenfield entry in larger host countries.

Microfinance is typically associated with joint liability of group members. However, a large part of microfinance institutions rather offers individual instead of group loans. We analyze the incentive mechanisms in both individual and group contracts. Moreover, we show that microfinance institutions offer group loans when the loan size is rather large, refinancing costs are high, and competition between microfinance institutions is low. Otherwise, individual loans are offered. Interestingly, our analysis predicts that individual lending in microfinance will gain in importance in the future if microfinance institutions continue to get better access to capital markets and if competition further rises.

We analyze the determinants of the corporate interest rates and the financial accelerator in the Czech Republic. Using a unique panel of 448 Czech firms from 1996 to 2002, we find that selected balance sheet indicators influence significantly the firm-specific interest rates. In particular, debt structure and cash flow have significant effects on interest rates, while indicators on collateral play no significant role. We find evidence that monetary policy has stronger effects on smaller firms than on medium and larger firms. Finally, we find no asymmetric effects in the monetary policy over the business cycle.

I discuss briefly the crisis itself and then give some criteria that should be used in evaluating any policy proposed o deal with it. This is followed by a critical discussion of some of the policy measures that have been suggested. Finally, I give a list of proposals, that I believe best satisfy the stated criteria. In contrast to almost all of the proposals that have been made, mine involve no bailout of the financial sector with public funds.

Credit rating agencies (CRAs) very often have been criticized for announcing inaccurate credit ratings and are suspected of being exposed to conflicts of interest. Despite these objections CRAs remained largely unregulated. Based on Pagano & Immordino (2007), we study the optimal regulation of CRAs in a model where rating quality is unobservable and enforcing regulation is costly. The model shows that minimum rating standards increase the social value of credit ratings. The model also analyzes implications for regulation in the presence of conflicts of interest between the CRA and the rated clients by direct bribes and by the joint provision of rating and consulting services.

We provide a critical assessment of the method used by the Cleveland Fed to correct expected inflation derived from index-linked bonds for liquidity and inflation risk premia and show how their method can be adapted to account for time-varying inflation risk premia. Furthermore, we show how sensitive the Cleveland Fed approach is to different measures of the liquidity premium. In addition we propose an alternative approach to decompose the bias in inflation expectations derived from index-linked bonds using a state-space estimation. Our results show that once one accounts for time-varying liquidity and inflation risk premia current 10-year U.S. inflation expectations are lower than estimated by the Cleveland Fed.

Traditionally, aggregate liquidity shocks are modelled as exogenous events. Extending our previous work (Cao & Illing, 2007), this paper analyses the adequate policy response to endogenous systemic liquidity risk. We analyse the feedback between lender of last resort policy and incentives of private banks, determining the aggregate amount of liquidity available. We show that imposing minimum liquidity standards for banks ex ante are a crucial requirement for sensible lender of last resort policy. In addition, we analyse the impact of equity requirements and narrow banking, in the sense that banks are required to hold sufficient liquid funds so as to pay out in all contingencies. We show that such a policy is strictly inferior to imposing minimum liquidity standards ex ante combined with lender of last resort policy.

Why do banks remain passive? In a model of bank-firm relationship we study the trade-off a bank faces when having defaulting firms declared bankrupt. First, the bank receives a payoff if a firm is liquidated. Second, it provides information about a firm’s type to its competitors. Thereby, asymmetric information between banks is reduced and bank competition intensifies. We find that the better the institutions and the more competitive the banking sector, the higher the bank’s incentive to bankrupt defaulting firms. This makes information between banks less asymmetric and thus leads to lower interest rates and less credit rationing.

It has been argued that competing banks make inefficiently frequent use of collateralization in situations where they are better able to evaluate a project's risk than entrepreneurs. We study the bank's choice between screening and collateralization in a model where banks do not have this superior screening skill. In particular, we study the effect of bank competition on this choice. We find that competing banks use collateral less often than a monopolistic bank because competition will intensify if both banks collateralize. Moreover, bank competition is welfare improving if collateralization is rather costly.

When a young entrepreneurial firm matures, it is often necessary to replace the founding entrepreneur by a professional manager. This replacement decision can be affected by the private benefits of control enjoyed by the entrepreneur which gives rise to a conflict of interest between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. We show that a combination of convertible securities and contingent control rights can be used to resolve this conflict efficiently. This contractual arrangement is frequently observed in venture capital finance.

Recent econometric evidence has noticeably changed views on the desirability and the appropriate design of explicit Deposit Insurance Schemes (DIS). The purpose of this paper is to take a second look at the data. After surveying recent empirical work and providing a theoretical framework, we argue that existing studies may suffer from a selection bias. Building on a new database on explicit deposit insurance compiled by the author, we perform a variety of semi-parametric and parametric tests to see whether and how explicit deposit insurance (de)stabilizes banking systems. We find that the evidence indeed suggests that a selection bias is present. Controlling for this bias leads to a reassessment of recent studies. In particular, making deposit insurance explicit has a rather moderate and, if any, stabilizing effect on the probability of experiencing a systemic crisis.

This paper analyses capital tax competition between jurisdictions of different size when multinational firms can shift some fraction of their tax base between them. For the case of revenue maximizing governments, we show that introducing profit shifting will not generally increase downward pressure on tax rates. We find that profit shifting decreases the tax-base elasticity of the low tax jurisdiction while increasing the elasticity of the high tax jurisdiction. Therefore, by the direct (impact) effect, tax rates will converge as a result of additional profit shifting opportunities. In general equilibrium, however, tax rates may decrease or increase in both jurisdictions.